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13 **UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT**  
14 **FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEVADA**

<p>15 In re:</p> <p>16 FRONT SIGHT MANAGEMENT LLC,</p> <p>17 Debtor.</p>	<p>18 Case No.: 22-11824-ABL</p> <p>19 Chapter 11</p> <p>20 <b><u>Hearing Date and Time</u></b>  Date: July 10, 12, 14, 18, 20, 2023  Time: 9:30 a.m.</p>
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21 **REPLY TO RESPONSE TO AMENDED OBJECTION TO CLAIM NO. 284 FILED BY**  
22 **LAS VEGAS DEVELOPMENT FUND, LLC**

23 Reorganized Debtor Front Sight Management LLC (“Front Sight”), by and through its  
24 special counsel, the law firm of Garman Turner Gordon LLP, hereby submits its reply (“Reply”)  
25 to the *Response to Amended Objection to Claim No. 284 Filed by Las Vegas Development Fund,*  
26 *LLC* [ECF No. 667] (the “Opposition”) filed by Las Vegas Development Fund, LLC (“LVDF”)  
27 on January 23, 2023.

28 **MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES**

**I.**  
**INTRODUCTION**

At its core, the Opposition misunderstands and misstates Front Sight’s Objection<sup>1</sup> to

<sup>1</sup> “Objection” as used herein shall refer to the *Amended Objection to Claim No. 284 Filed by Las Vegas Development Fund, LLC* [ECF No. 628]. All capitalized undefined terms used herein shall be ascribed the definitions set forth in the Objection unless otherwise indicated.

1 LVDF’s POC. Front Sight has not changed its position at all. Front Sight is responding to the  
2 claims asserted against it by LVDF, which are based solely on the Construction Loan Agreement,  
3 the Construction Deed of Trust Security Agreement, Assignment of Leases and Rents, and Fixture  
4 Filing (the “Deed of Trust”), and the Promissory Note (collectively, as amended, the “LVDF Loan  
5 Documents”) between the parties.<sup>2</sup> The LVDF Loan Documents are the only agreements between  
6 LVDF and Front Sight and, as fully integrated contracts, stand on their own.

7 The LVDF Loan Documents provide a commitment to loan \$75,000,000, later reduced to  
8 \$50,000,000.<sup>3</sup> LVDF did not fund the loan, admits now that it never could fund the loan – not  
9 even a fraction of it – and Front Sight suffered significant damages as a result because the project  
10 that relied on the funding could not be built. LVDF is not entitled to *any* recovery due to its  
11 breaches of the LVDF Loan Documents, as any money advanced did not provide any benefit to  
12 Front Sight, which was left with incomplete construction and ultimately a loss of all equity.

13 LVDF now seeks to insert a new term in the LVDF Loan Documents that is indisputably  
14 not there: that LVDF had no actual obligation to lend any funds, and to the extent it did, its loan  
15 commitment was limited to the funds it actually raised from EB-5 investors. Notably, this  
16 argument is at direct odds with LVDF’s requested amendment lowering its Loan Commitment  
17 from \$75,000,000 to \$50,000,000, as no such amendment would be needed if LVDF had no  
18 obligation to provide any funding in the first place. This argument is also inconsistent with LVDF’s  
19 own admission in the Opposition:

20 LVDF is only the lender. LVDF did not make any representations to Front Sight  
21 about a different entity’s (EB5IA’s) ability to raise EB-5 funds.

22 *See* Opposition, p. 16, ll. 13-13 (emphasis in original). As the lender, LVDF was obligated to fund  
23 the loan and any failure of LVDF to obtain sufficient funds to do so is LVDF’s problem.

24 Front Sight has also pursued the individuals associated with LVDF (Robert Dzibula, Jon

25 \_\_\_\_\_  
26 <sup>2</sup> LVDF has now sought to add a new claim for fraud which, as discussed below, is not timely, is not a secured claim,  
cannot be recovered from the reserve, and therefore is not only improper, it is irrelevant to these proceedings.

27 <sup>3</sup> LVDF originally agreed to fund \$75,000,000 and later reduced that to \$50,000,000. All references to the loan amount  
28 herein will reflect the lower amount of \$50,000,000 despite that each of the original LVDF Loan Documents stated  
the higher amount.

1 Fleming, and Linda Stanwood, and their related entities, EB5 Impact Advisors, LLC (“EB5IA”)  
2 and EB5 Impact Capital Regional Center, LLV (“EB5RC”), as well as LVDF, for other actions  
3 related to the inducement by the parties to engage Front Sight it is entire fraudulent scheme. That  
4 fraud is relevant to Front Sight’s affirmative claims against the remaining parties in the Adversary  
5 Proceeding to assert and recover its full range of damages for the harm that they have collectively  
6 caused and those claims, to the extent made against LVDF, can also offset the amounts sought  
7 through the LVDF Claim.

8 However, for purposes of the Claim Objection, the sole question before this Court is  
9 whether LVDF, pursuant to the LVDF Loan Documents, is entitled to collect more than  
10 \$12,000,000 from a reserve account for the \$6,375,000 it advanced on a promised loan of  
11 \$50,000,000, **a \$43,625,000 or 87.255% shortfall**, when such shortfall was a breach of the promise  
12 to loan and resulted in no benefit and instead caused great harm to Front Sight. The answer to that  
13 question is a resounding “No.”

14 **II.**  
15 **LEGAL ARGUMENT AND ANALYSIS**

16 **A. LVDF’s Recitation of the Facts Seeks to Introduce Parole Evidence When None Is**  
17 **Admissible.**

18 The claim asserted in the LVDF POC is the sole affirmative claim by LVDF against the  
19 estate. It is a claim for payment under the LVDF Loan Documents. The LVDF Loan Documents  
20 are fully integrated agreements and, for purposes of determining whether LVDF is owed anything  
21 at all (it is not), this Court need not, and cannot, go beyond the four corners of the LVDF Loan  
22 Documents.

23 **1. Relevant Parol Evidence Law.**

24 Parol, or extrinsic, evidence “is not admissible to add to, subtract from, vary, or contradict  
25 ... written instruments which ... are contractual in nature and which are valid, complete,  
26 unambiguous, and unaffected by accident or mistake.” *Ringle v. Bruton*, 120 Nev. 82, 86 P.3d  
27 1032, 1037–38 (2004). Thus, parol evidence is not admissible to vary or contradict the written  
28 agreement’s terms. *Tallman v. First Nat’l Bank of Nev.*, 66 Nev. 248, 208 P.2d 302, 306 (1949).

1 The parol evidence rule is both an evidentiary and substantive rule that applies in equity as well as  
2 at law. *State ex rel. List v. Courtesy Motors*, 95 Nev. 103, 590 P.2d 163, 165 (1979)(citing  
3 *Wheeler, Kelly & Hagny Inv. Co. v. Curts*, 147 P.2d 737, 740 (Kan. 1944)).

4 Here, LVDF seeks to use parol evidence, specifically prior communications and  
5 agreements between *different* parties, to add a term to the CLA that is indisputably not there.  
6 Specifically, LVDF asks this Court to read in a requirement that LVDF is not obligated to fully  
7 fund its \$50,000,000 commitment until and unless it first raises those funds from EB5 investors  
8 which requirement is unequivocally not stated in the CLA. Or in other words, to render the  
9 \$50,000,000 commitment superfluous.

10 **2. The LVDF Loan Documents are Integrated Contracts.**

11 An integrated contract is a written contract which contains all the terms and conditions of  
12 the agreement. 17 Am. J. 2d Contracts, §260. If a contract is integrated then it may neither be  
13 supplemented nor contradicted by any additional evidence of any kind. *Kuchta v. Sheltie Opco,*  
14 *LLC*, 466 P.3d 543 (Nev. App. 2020).

15 LVDF and Front Sight are parties to three agreements which constitute the LVDF Loan  
16 Documents. The LVDF Loan Documents are integrated agreements:

17  
18 11.11 ENTIRE AGREEMENT. THE NOTE, THIS DEED OF TRUST AND THE  
19 OTHER LOAN DOCUMENTS<sup>4</sup> CONTAIN THE FINAL, ENTIRE  
20 AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE PARTIES HERETO RELATING TO THE  
21 SUBJECT MATTER HEREOF AND THEREOF AND ALL PRIOR  
22 AGREEMENTS, WHETHER WRITTEN OR ORAL, RELATIVE HERETO  
23 AND THERETO WHICH ARE NOT CONTAINED HEREIN OR THEREIN  
24 ARE SUPERSEDED AND TERMINATED HEREBY. THE NOTE, THIS DEED  
25 OF TRUST AND THE LOAN DOCUMENTS MAY NOT BE CONTRADICTED  
26 BY EVIDENCE OF PRIOR, CONTEMPORANEOUS, OR SUBSEQUENT  
27 ORAL AGREEMENTS OR DISCUSSIONS OF THE PARTIES HERETO.  
28 EXCEPT AS INCORPORATED IN WRITING INTO THE LOAN  
DOCUMENTS, THERE ARE NO REPRESENTATIONS, UNDERSTANDINGS,  
STIPULATIONS, AGREEMENTS OR PROMISES, ORAL OR WRITTEN,

4 The Other Loan Documents is defined as “the other agreements, documents and instruments (the “Other Documents”) now or hereafter governing, securing, or guaranteeing the Loan evidenced by the Note (the Note, this Deed of Trust and the Other Documents being sometimes hereinafter collectively referred to as the “Loan Documents”)” Deed of Trust, p. 1.

1 WITH RESPECT TO THE MATTERS ADDRESSED IN THE LOAN  
2 DOCUMENTS.

3 *See* Deed of Trust, § 11.11.

4 **3. The LVDF Loan Documents Are Clear on Their Face, and Must Be Interpreted  
5 Based on Their Plain Language.**

6 The goal of contract interpretation is to give effect to the parties' mutual intentions. *Pioneer*  
7 *Title Ins. & Trust Co. v. Cantrell*, 71 Nev. 243, 286 P.2d 261, 263 (1955) (quoting *Caruso v. John*  
8 *Hancock Mut. Life Ins. Co.*, 136 N.J.L. 597, 57 A.2d 359, 360 (1948) (“The law will not make a  
9 better contract for the parties than they themselves have seen fit to enter into....”). A document  
10 that is “clear on its face [ ] will be construed from the written language and enforced as  
11 written.” *Sandy Valley Assocs. v. Sky Ranch Estate Owners Ass'n*, 117 Nev. 948, 35 P.3d 964, 967  
12 (2001) (citing *Ellison v. C.S.A.A.*, 106 Nev. 601, 797 P.2d 975, 977 (1990)).

13 Here, the LVDF Loan Documents are clear on their face, with respect to the amount that  
14 LVDF was obligated to fund:

- 15 • “Borrower has requested that the Lender provide the Loan (as hereinafter defined” to Borrower  
16 in the principal sum of up to SEVENTY-FIVE MILLION DOLLARS (“75,000,000”) for the  
17 purpose of paying off Existing Liens (as hereinafter defined) and financing the construction of  
18 the Improvements (as hereinafter defined in accordance with the Budget”). CLA, § A.
- 19 • ““**Commitment**” means an amount not to exceed seventy five million dollars (\$75,000,000).  
20 Such Commitment shall be reduced by any principal payments made by or on behalf of  
21 Borrower or any principal reductions otherwise required under and pursuant to the Laon  
22 Documents.” CLA, definitions.
- 23 • ““**Loan**” means collectively, the loan of the proceeds of the Note by Lender to Borrower in  
24 Advances to be made pursuant to the terms of this Agreement in the maximum aggregate principal  
25 amount not to exceed the Commitment.” CLA, definitions.
- 26 • ““**Senior Debt**” to be “funded subsequent to this ‘Loan’.” CLA, definitions.
- 27 • “Subject to the terms and conditions of the agreement, Lender agrees to lend to Borrower and  
28 Borrower agrees to borrow from Lender, the proceeds of the Loan from time to time in  
accordance with the terms hereof until the Maturity Date, for the purpose of refinancing,  
developing and constructing the Project; provided, however, Lender shall not be obligated to  
make any Advance if, after giving effect to such Advance, the sum of Lender's aggregate  
Advances then outstanding would exceed the Commitment” CLA, § 1.1.
- Conditions of Borrowing set forth in Article II do not include as a condition that LVDF has  
raised funds. CLA, Art. II.

- 1 • Promissory Note executed in amount of \$50,000,000.
- 2 • Deed of Trust executed and filed against Front Sight’s property in the amount of \$50,000,000.

3 Thus, despite LVDF inexplicably now stating that “Front Sight ‘wholly fails to cite to a  
4 single provision in the loan documents to support [ ] a claim [that LVDF was contractually  
5 obligated to fund the maximum loan amount],”<sup>5</sup> the LVDF Loan Documents say just that.  
6 Moreover, contrary to LVDF’s assertion, there is no provision “clearly provid[ing] that LVDF may  
7 lend ‘up to’ the maximum loan amount.”<sup>6</sup> Nowhere in the LVDF Loan Documents does it state  
8 that LVDF’s performance is optional, contingent on an ability to raise the \$50,000,000, or that the  
9 \$50,000,000 commitment could or would be largely unavailable.

10 **4. There is No Ambiguity But, Even If There Were, It is Construed Against the**  
11 **Drafter, Which is LVDF.**

12 LVDF seems to potentially argue that there is some ambiguity in what the commitment  
13 was and therefore, parol evidence can be introduced. *See* Objection at p. 11, ll. 20-22. However,  
14 a contract is only ambiguous when it is “reasonably susceptible to different constructions or  
15 interpretations.” *Agric. Aviation Eng'g Co. v. Bd. of Clark County Comm'rs*, 106 Nev. 396, 794  
16 P.2d 710, 712 (1990). An ambiguity must be inherent within the contractual term itself, and “does  
17 not arise simply because the parties disagree on how to interpret their contract.” *Kuchta v. Sheltie*  
18 *Opco, LLC*, 466 P.3d 543 (Nev. App. 2020).

19 Here there is no ambiguity. The CLA contains a commitment to loan up to \$50,000,000.  
20 Black’s Law Dictionary defines a “Loan Commitment” as “A lender’s binding promise to a  
21 borrower to lend a specified amount of money at a certain interest rate, usu. within a specified  
22 period and for a specified purpose (such as buying real estate).” Black’s Law Dictionary (11<sup>th</sup> ed.  
23 2019). Thus, LVDF obligated itself to fund up to \$50,000,000. LVDF wants to read that provision  
24 to say any amount it chose up to \$50,000,00 based on what funds it has to loan, but such  
25 interpretation would render the use of the word “Commitment” meaningless. Such interpretation

26 \_\_\_\_\_  
27 <sup>5</sup> *See* Opposition, p. 11, ll.18-20.

28 <sup>6</sup> *See* Opposition, p. 11, 20-21.

1 would also be contrary to LVDF's subsequent acts related to the LVDF Loan Documents in which  
2 it amended the CLA to reduce the commitment to \$50,000,000 from \$75,000,000. If there was no  
3 requirement to loan \$75,000,000 at Front Sight's request, then there was absolutely no reason to  
4 later amend the loan to reduce the commitment to \$50,000,000. Likewise, it would have been  
5 nonsensical to burden the real property with a \$50,000,000 lien if LVDF had no obligation, or  
6 ability, to fund anywhere close to that amount. LVDF's attempts to create an ambiguity to avoid  
7 its liability must fail.

8 Likewise, there is no ambiguity based on the CLA stating that the loan will be comprised  
9 of EB5 investments and comply with the EB-5 provisions. See Objection at p. 6, ll. 9-16.  
10 Certainly, Front Sight was aware that the CLA would be comprised of EB-5 Investments. But the  
11 source of the funding does not relieve a lender from having or obtaining the funds to fund the loan  
12 it committed to. Furthermore, the LVDF Loan Documents could have stated that LVDF was only  
13 obligated to fund the amounts it could have raised. They did not. Front Sight would not have  
14 entered into the LVDF Loan Documents if it believed that it would only receive \$6,375,000 to  
15 complete a project with a budget nearly 10x that.

16 Nonetheless, even if there is an ambiguity (there is not), any ambiguous term or language  
17 in a document will be construed against the drafter of the document. Under the rule of *contra*  
18 *proferentem*, a latently ambiguous contract is construed against its drafter if the interpretation  
19 advanced by the non-drafter is reasonable. See *Metric Constructors, Inc. v. NASA*, 169 F.3d 747,  
20 751 (Fed.Cir.1999); *Community Heating*, 987 F.2d at 1579. *Contra proferentem*, is followed  
21 frequently in the Ninth Circuit and Nevada. See *In re Escoto*, 20176 Bankr. LEXIS 759 [\*10]  
22 (BAP 9th Cir. 2017) [applying Nevada law]; *F Q Men's Club v. Doe*, \_\_\_ Nev. \_\_\_, 471 P. 3rd 753  
23 (2020) (Contract); *American First Fed. Credit Union v. Soro*, 131 Nev. 737, 359 P. 3rd 105 (2015)  
24 (Loan); *Anvui, LLC v. G. L. Dragon, LLC*, 123 Nev. 213, 215-6, 163 P. 3rd 405 (2007) (Lease);  
25 *Glenbrook Homeowners Assn. v. Glenbrook Co.*, 111 Nev. 909, 901 P. 2nd 132 (1995) (Master  
26 Development Plan); *In re Escoto*, BAP No. NV-16-1211-LJuKu, 20176 Bankr. LEXIS 759, \*10  
27 (BAP 9th Cir. March 21, 2017)(Loan).

28 The LVDF Loan Documents were drafted by Michael Brand, LVDF's counsel, and Mr.

1 Dzibula, LVDF's principal and a licensed attorney. Thus, to the extent LVDF contends there is  
2 an ambiguity as to the meaning of the commitment (there is not), it must be construed against  
3 LVDF which, again, renders the CLA clear on its face that the commitment to loan \$50,000,000  
4 was a commitment to loan as much up to \$50,000,000 as Front Sight requested subject to the other  
5 requirements of the CLA. Certainly, LVDF, as the drafter of the contract, could have stated that  
6 the "commitment" was not actually a commitment and that it only had to use "best efforts" to raise  
7 funds and only loan up to the amount that it raised without any guarantee. It did not.

8 **B. LVDF Admits That It Never Intended to Honor its Obligations.**

9 LVDF is now seeking to turn this matter into a dispute over which party breached first.  
10 However, LVDF cannot escape the fact that it has now removed all doubt of its inability to raise  
11 the funds promised in the LVDF Loan Documents, an actual and anticipatory breach, making clear  
12 that the purported non-monetary breachers were mere distractions to try to protect against its own  
13 wrongdoing.

14 **1. LVDF Concedes that It Never Could, and Never Intended to, Honor Its  
15 Contractual Obligations.**

16 A breach of contract requires a valid contract, a breach by defendant, and damages as a  
17 result of a breach. *Med. Providers Fin. Corp. II v. New Life Centers, L.L.C.*, 818 F.Supp.2d 1271,  
18 1274 (D. Nev. 2011). An anticipatory breach, which may be express or implied, is a breach of a  
19 contract that occurs when one party to the contract, without justification and prior to a breach by  
20 the other party, makes a statement or engages in conduct indicating that it will not or cannot  
21 substantially perform its duties under the contract *Shaw v. CitiMortgage, Inc.*, 201 F. Supp. 3d  
22 1222, 1250 (D. Nev. 2016), amended in part, 3:13-CV-0445-LRH-VPC, 2016 WL 11722898 (D.  
23 Nev. Nov. 1, 2016)(citing *Nev. Power Co.*, 2006 WL 1582101, at \*10, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS  
24 36135, at \*28). If one party anticipatorily breaches the contract, a repudiation of the contract has  
25 occurred, and the non-breaching party is excused from performing its obligations under the  
26 contract. *Kahle v. Jostiner*, 455 P.2d 42, 44 (Nev. 1969)

27 LVDF was in breach of the CLA almost from the moment it signed it, especially given its  
28 current assertion that it never intended to fund the full amount promised. Specifically, in his



1 declaration supporting the LVDF POC, Mr. Dzibula repeatedly seeks to disclaim his obligations  
2 by asserting the speculative nature of his ability to raise funds and admission that it became clear  
3 to him *prior to executing the CLA* that he would be unable to reach Front Sight’s financing goals.  
4 *See Dzibula Decl.* ¶¶ 7, 20, 23, 28. By July 2018, LVDF, which had loaned approximately only  
5 10% of the commitment in the nearly twenty months since executing the CLA, instead went on  
6 the offensive to try to avoid liability for its own wrongdoing. Mr. Dzibula has now made clear  
7 that that was because LVDF never had any ability to actually honor the commitment and loan the  
8 funds as promised. Because LVDF contends that it never intended to fund the commitment,  
9 despite its promise to do so, it was in breach, an anticipatory breach, of the CLA almost from the  
10 moment it was executed.

11 **2. Alternatively, LVDF Did Not Enter Into the LVDF Loan Documents in Good**  
12 **Faith.**

13 Under Nevada law, “[e]very contract imposes upon each party a duty of good faith and fair  
14 dealing in its performance and execution.” *A.C. Shaw Constr. v. Washoe Cty.*, 105 Nev. 913, 784  
15 P.2d 9, 9 (1989) (quoting Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 205); *see also Nelson v. Heer*, 123  
16 Nev. 217, 163 P.3d 420, 427 (2007) (“It is well established that all contracts impose upon the  
17 parties an implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing, which prohibits arbitrary or unfair  
18 actions by one party that work to the disadvantage of the other.”). The implied covenant  
19 “encompass[es] any promises which a reasonable person in the position of the promisee would  
20 be justified in understanding were included.” *511 W. 232nd Owners Corp. v. Jennifer Realty Co.*,  
21 773 N.E.2d 496, 501 (N.Y. 2002). If, as LVDF now conceded, it could not have loaned even a  
22 fraction of the amount it contractually agreed to, it did not enter into the LVDF Loan Documents  
23 in good faith, which is a breach of the CLA from the outset.

24 **3. In Any Event, LVDF Breached First Because Front Sight Did Not Breach the**  
25 **CLA.**

26 LVDF contends that Front Sight breached the following sections of the CLA: Sections 3.2  
27 (“never provided monthly project costs”); Section 5.1 (“appeared to be running behind on  
28 construction”); Section 5.27 (“failed to obtain Senior Debt”); and Section 5.10(e) (“failed to

1 provide the requisite EB-5 prove-up documents that included bank statements”). *See* Objection, p.  
2 7, ll. 4-8. There were no such breaches:

- 3 • Section 3.2 – Front Sight tendered evidence of project costs by means of spreadsheets and  
4 summaries prepared by its accountants and recreated monthly reports after originals were  
5 destroyed in a fire.
- 6 • Section 5.1 – Front Sight continually kept LVDF apprised of its construction progress, and  
7 such timely progress reports were provided to the EB5 investors by LVDF.
- 8 • Section 5.27 – Borrower was required to use its best efforts to obtain senior debt pursuant to  
9 the express terms of the CLA, which it did, included by obtaining the Morales Line of Credit.
- 10 • Section 5.10(e) - Front Sight tendered that documents necessary and even recreated monthly  
11 reports after originals were destroyed in a fire.

12 *See* ECF No. 384, Ex. “20” to Exhibit “1.” (August 20, 2018 Response to Notice of Default).

13 **C. LVDF’s Attempts to Avoid the Failures in its Claim By Adding New Claims Related**  
14 **to the Morales Line of Credit is Improper.**

15 LVDF originally asserted a claim based on a purported breach of, and for repayment under,  
16 the LVDF Loan Documents. That claim was filed as a secured claim and, as a result, LVDF was  
17 separately classified in the Debtor’s Plan, a reserve in the amount of the purported claim was  
18 established, and LVDF submitted a single ballot on account of its secured claim. LVDF now,  
19 however, seeks to add a new claim – an unsecured claim that it indisputably acknowledged was  
20 property of the bankruptcy estate – and prosecute that claim as part of its original claim. LVDF’s  
21 attempts are untimely, improper, contrary to the record, and must be denied.

22 **1. LVDF Misrepresents the Record In This Case.**

23 In order to argue to this Court that its Amended Proof of Claim is proper, LVDF grossly  
24 skews the record. LVDF suggests that “the parties are litigating the claim in the Adversary  
25 Proceeding.” *See* Objection, p. 11, ll. 1-2. That is incorrect. Front Sight is litigating its affirmative  
26 claims against the LVDF Parties. The remaining claims in the Adversary Proceeding, including  
27 the fraud claim, were already determined to be property of the estate, acquired by Nevada PF, and  
28 released pursuant to the Plan and related agreements. Specifically:

- On June 23, 2022, Front Sight removed the State Court Case to the Bankruptcy Court, thereby  
commencing adversary proceeding no. AP-22-01116-ABL (the “Adversary Proceeding”).

- 1 • On June 27, 2022, LVDF filed a *Motion to Remand* [AP-22-01116-ABL, ECF No. 4] in the  
2 Adversary Proceeding, which *Motion to Remand* was joined [AP-22-01116-ABL, ECF No. 55]  
3 by the remaining LVDF Parties.
- 4 • On June 27, 2022, the LVDF Parties also filed a *Motion to Terminate Stay* (the “Stay Relief  
5 Motion”) in the Chapter 11 Case to pursue the Counterclaims. *See*, ECF No. 206.
- 6 • Pursuant to an oral ruling on September 9, 2022 and orders entered on September 15, 2022  
7 (the “Orders”), the Bankruptcy Court denied the Remand Motion and Stay Relief Motion, for  
8 the reasons set forth on the Court’s record, and found that “[a]fter careful analysis of the claims  
9 that have been advanced by LVDF that were pending in the state court lawsuit at the time of  
10 removal, the Court concludes that those claims are property of the estate, such that only Front  
11 Sight, as debtor-in-possession, has standing to pursue them.” *See* Sept. 9, 2022 Hrg. Tran. P.  
12 17, ll. 16-20 (available at ECF No. 113); ECF No. 107; Case No. 22-11824-abl, ECF No. 346.
- 13 • On September 15, 2022, it its *Order Approving Stipulation Resolving Debtor’s Motion for an*  
14 *Order Confirming Terminating Sanction Order is Void as a Violation of the Automatic Stay,*  
15 *or, in the Alternative, Motion for Relief from Order Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil*  
16 *Procedure 60(b)*, pursuant to the **agreement of the LVDF Parties** and Front Sight, the  
17 Bankruptcy Court ordered that “the LVDF counterclaims are property of the bankruptcy  
18 estate.” *See* ECF No. 106.
- 19 • On October 4, 2022, Debtor filed its *Debtor’s Second Amended Chapter 11 Plan of*  
20 *Reorganization* (the “Plan”) [ECF No. 205] which was confirmed by *Findings of Fact,*  
21 *Conclusions of Law, and Order Confirming the Debtor’s Second Amended Chapter 11 Plan of*  
22 *Reorganization* (the “Confirmation Order”) [ECF No. 556] entered on November 29, 2022.
- 23 • No party appealed the Confirmation Order, and the Confirmation Order is now a final order. *See*  
24 *generally*, docket.<sup>7</sup>
- 25 • Pursuant to the Plan, Nevada PF acquired the equity interest in Front Sight and all claims owned  
26 by the estate. *Id.*

## 2. LVDF’s Amended Claim Is an Untimely New Claim for the Morales Line of Credit Claim.

27 LVDF filed its original claim on August 11, 2022. That claim was a single secured claim  
28 based on the money it contended it was owed under the LVDF Loan Documents. LVDF now seeks  
– over four months after the proof of claim deadline and two months after the plan in the case has  
been confirmed – to assert a new unsecured claim based on fraud.

Neither the Bankruptcy Code nor the rules specifically address allowance of amended

<sup>7</sup> LVDF has now filed an untimely and improper collateral attack on this Court’s Orders, including the Confirmation Order, through a *Motion for Clarification and/or Motion for Reconsideration* [ECF No. 141]. Front Sight will address the arguments raised therein to the extent necessary.

1 proofs of claim. *In re Shotwell Landfill, Inc.*, No. 13-02590-8-SWH, at \*7-8 (Bankr. E.D.N.C.  
2 June 20, 2014) (citing *Clamp-All Corp. v. Foresta (In re Clamp-All Corp.)*, 235 B.R. 137, 140 (1st  
3 Cir. BAP 1999)). However, Fed. Bank. P. 7015, which incorporates Fed. R. Civ. P. 15, allows  
4 relation back when “the amendment asserts a claim or defense that arose out of the conduct,  
5 transaction, or occurrence set out - or attempted to be set out - in the original pleading.” *In re*  
6 *Shotwell Landfill*, at \*7-8 (citing Fed. R. Bankr. P. 7015(c)(1)(B)). Based thereon, courts typically  
7 allow relation back of an amendment to a timely filed proof of claim “where the purpose is to cure  
8 a defect in the claim as originally filed, to describe the claim with greater particularity or to plead  
9 a new theory of recovery on the facts set forth in the original claim.” *In re International Horizons,*  
10 *Inc.*, 751 F.2d 1213, 1216 (11th Cir. 1985); *see also In re Sambo’s Restaurants, Inc.*, 754 F.2d  
11 811, 816-17 (9th Cir. 1985); *In re Commonwealth Corporation*, 617 F.2d 415, 420 (5th Cir.1980).  
12 When faced with post bar date amendments to proofs of claim, the court must subject the amended  
13 claim “to *careful scrutiny* to prevent an attempt to file a new claim under the guise of an  
14 amendment.” *In re Mitchell*, 116 B.R. 63, 64 (Bankr. W.D. Va. 1990) (citing *In re Newcomb*, 60  
15 B.R. 520, 522 (Bankr. W.D. Va. 1986))(emphasis added). Whether to allow an amendment to a  
16 timely filed proof of claim is an equitable determination that lies within the sound discretion of the  
17 court. *See In re Hemingway Transport, Inc.*, 954 F.2d 1, 10 (1st Cir. 1992).

18 The Bankruptcy Court’s decision in *In re Shotwell* is particularly instructive in this matter:

19 These three documents, the Explanation of Claim, the Addendum and the 2012  
20 draft K-1 are the only documents attached to the original claim that describe the  
21 basis for the claim. Although the original claim and its attachments provide a  
22 minimum of information regarding the Phantom Income and stock reimbursement  
23 components (i.e., the Memorandum Agreement was not attached), those  
24 components of the claim are at least identified. However, nowhere in the original  
25 proof of claim or its attachments is there any indication that Cook was owed unpaid  
26 compensation from the debtor or that Cook would later seek to amend to set forth  
27 such a claim. In fact, the addendum to the original proof of claim specifically stated  
28 that the “total amount of claim as of Petition Date” amounted to \$1,392,995.30. . .  
Accordingly, the amended claim is not an attempt to cure a defect that was present  
in the original claim or to describe the original claim with greater particularity. . . .

***None of the factors necessary for relation back of an amended proof of claim are present here. The amended claim does not cure a defect in the original claim or describe the original claim with more particularity. Instead, Cook asserts an***

1 *entirely new claim arising from alleged unpaid wages and compensation during*  
2 *Cook's employment with the debtor from 2008 through 2012. This compensation*  
3 *component is wholly unrelated to and does not arise from the same set of facts*  
4 *pled in the original proof of claim. Accordingly, relation back of the amended*  
5 *claim to the time of the original proof of claim shall not be allowed.*

6 *In re Shotwell Landfill, Inc.*, No. 13-02590-8-SWH, at \*11-12 (Bankr. E.D.N.C. June 20, 2014)  
7 (emphasis added).

8 Further, a bankruptcy court may disallow an amendment to a proof of claim if allowing  
9 that amendment would result in prejudice to other parties. *In re Sambo's Rest., Inc.*, 754 F.2d at  
10 816-17. The factors a court may consider to determine prejudice include whether there has been  
11 “bad faith or unreasonable delay in filing the amendment, impact on other claimants, reliance by  
12 the debtor or other creditors, and change of the debtor's position.” *Wall Street Plaza, LLC v. JSJF*  
13 *Corp. (In re JSJF Corp.)*, 344 B.R. 94, 102 (9th Cir. BAP 2006) (quoting *Roberts Farms, Inc. v.*  
14 *Bultman (In re Roberts Farms, Inc.)*, 980 F.2d 1248, 1251-52 (9th Cir.1992)). The burden of  
15 showing prejudice is on the objecting party. *In re Sambo's Rest., Inc.*, 754 F.2d at 817.

16 Here, LVDF previously stipulated that the Morales line of credit claim was an estate claim.  
17 Moreover, LVDF did not assert any claims based on the State Court Action in its Initial Proof of  
18 Claim. Instead, LVDF asserted only a secured claim based on the LVDF Loan Documents. The  
19 “Morales line of credit” claim is one based on fraud, a tort, which is an unsecured claim. The  
20 amount of any purported unsecured claim by Front Sight was never factored into a liquidation  
21 analysis, was not voted by LVDF, and not disclosed in connection with the Debtor’s disclosure  
22 statement or plan. Any recovery on account of the Morales line of credit claim would be limited  
23 to a *pro rata* distribution from the reserve account for the general unsecured claims (as defined in  
24 the Plan) which is separate from the reserve established in this case. Amendment at this late date  
25 not only seeks to add an entirely new claim, it is prejudicial to the entire unsecured creditor class  
26 who relied on the claims existing at the time of Plan confirmation to determine their proposed  
27 distributions under the Plan, which did not take into account an LVDF unsecured claim.

28 **3. The Fraud Claim Against Front Sight, Which LVDF Stipulated Was Property of  
the Bankruptcy Estate, Cannot Serve as an Informal Proof of Claim.**

Under Ninth Circuit law, “an informal proof of claim must “[1] state an explicit demand

1 showing the nature and amount of the claim against the estate, and [2] evidence an intent to hold  
2 the debtor liable.” *In re Harrington*, Bankr. No. 02-43878-PBS, USDC Case No. C06-5100BHS,  
3 at \*11 (W.D. Wash. Aug. 10, 2007) (citing *In re Anderson-Walker Indus. Inc.*, 798 F.2d 1285,  
4 1287 (9th Cir. 1986)); *Sambo's Rest., Inc v. Wheeler (In re Sambo's Rest., Inc.)*, 754 F.2d 811, 815  
5 (9th Cir.1985) (citing *Cnty. of Napa v. Franciscan Vineyards (In re Franciscan Vineyards)*, 597  
6 F.2d 181, 182-83 (9th Cir.1979) (per curiam), *cert. denied*, 445 U.S. 915, 100 S.Ct. 1274, 63  
7 L.Ed.2d 598 (1980) ). In applying this doctrine, the Ninth Circuit BAP has instructed that, to  
8 establish an effective informal claim, the creditor must show, at a minimum: “(1) presentment of  
9 a writing; (2) within the time for the filing of claims; (3) by or on behalf of the creditor; (4) bringing  
10 to the attention of the court; (5) the nature and amount of a claim asserted against the estate.” *Pac.*  
11 *Res. Credit Union v. Fish (In re Fish)*, 456 B.R. 413, 417 (9th Cir. BAP 2011).

12 Here, while the claims asserted by LVDF were on file in the Adversary Proceeding, those  
13 claims were determined to be property of the estate ***including through stipulation by LVDF***. All  
14 parties relied on the Court’s findings and the stipulation for, among other things, voting on a plan  
15 that limited LVDF’s claim to a secured claim based on the claim it filed and Nevada PF acquiring,  
16 and releasing, the estate claims against the Piazza Parties. LVDF cannot now contend that it  
17 actually intended to pursue certain claims against Front Sight when they were not only included in  
18 the original proof of claim, but more so because they were recognized to be estate property and  
19 addressed through a plan that was confirmed over four months ago without objection by LVDF.

20 **4. Front Sight Has Repeatedly Objected to the Purported Fraud Claim Related to**  
21 **the Morales line of Credit.**

22 LVDF contends that Front Sight’s only objection to the Amended Proof of Claim regarding  
23 the inclusion of LVDF’s fraud claim related to the Morales Line of Credit is that it was late filed.  
24 *See* Opposition, p. 8, ll. 18-20. This is incorrect. Certainly, the failure to timely file and/or pursue  
25 a claim related to the Morales Line of Credit, and instead taking actions indicating a clear intent  
26 not to pursue the claim against LVDF, should resolve the issue entirely. But if it does not, as Front  
27 Sight argued in the Objection, the claim is without merit *See* Objection, p. 9, l.5 – p. 10.  
28

1 **D. The CLA is Illusory If LVDF Pursues Its Argument that It Had No Obligation to**  
2 **Fund the Commitment.**

3 LVDF attempts to reframe Front Sight's argument regarding the illusory nature of the  
4 contract (if LVDF's position that it had no obligation to fund any amounts if it could not raise them  
5 is accepted) to an argument that condition precedents render the LVDF Loan Documents illusory.  
6 *See* Opposition, p. 14, ll 7-18. This attempt to reframe the argument actually helps clarify Front  
7 Sight's point. Front Sight is not arguing that conditions precedent render contracts illusory because  
8 notably, *there is no condition precedent in the CLA that LVDF first raise funds before it is*  
9 *required to honor its loan commitment.* Instead, the conditions precedent are set forth in detail in  
10 Article II of the CLA and each was either satisfied or waived. Rather, Front Sight is arguing that  
11 because there was no unsatisfied conditions precedent, LVDF cannot claim to have no obligation  
12 to honor its contractual commitments because, if LVDF so claims, then it is claiming to have no  
13 obligation under the contract which renders it illusory.

14 In other words, LVDF's argument is attempting to write in a condition precedent to the  
15 contract that does not exist, *i.e.*, EB51A and/or LVDF's ability to raise EB-5 funds. However,  
16 LVDF already conceded that "LVDF is only the lender. LVDF did not make any representations  
17 to Front Sight about a different entity's (EB51A's) ability to raise EB-5 funds." LVDF cannot  
18 hinge its contractual obligation on its agreement with other parties and default on its contractual  
19 obligations for reasons not controlled by the borrower and face no fault. Either LVDF was  
20 obligated to fund the commitment, and it breached the CLA, or LVDF did not have any obligations  
21 under the CLA, and it is illusory.

22 **E. LVDF Failed to Set Forth the Reasonableness of Its Fees, that They Are Not**  
23 **Duplicative, or Assert the Damages for Which They are Needed to Compensate and**  
24 **Therefore, Such Fees Must Be Disallowed.**

25 As set forth at length in the Objection, in order to recover the fees sought, they must be  
26 reasonable and compensatory. *See* Objection, pp. 16-19. In its Opposition, LVDF cites to general  
27 law regarding allowance of reasonable fees but makes not argument that its fees were actually  
28 reasonable. *See* Opposition, p. 19, l. 5 – p. 21, l. 21. Moreover, while acknowledging that there is  
caselaw that states that a party is not entitled to duplicative fees, LVDF does nothing, other to the

1 claim it cannot find a case in the Ninth Circuit, to suggest that the amounts it seeks are not  
2 duplicative. *See id.* Finally, while the Objection sets forth in detail that, in order to be permitted,  
3 default fees and costs must actually compensate for some damage of the lender in order to not be  
4 punitive, LVDF offers no evidence, or even argument, that the more the \$6,307,000.00 it seeks in  
5 additional to the amount advanced are tied to any actual damage. *See id.* As such, the default  
6 interest, attorneys fees, foreclosure fees, and late fees must be disallowed.

7  
8 **III.**  
**CONCLUSION**

9 Based on the foregoing, Front Sight respectfully requests that the POC be disallowed for  
10 the reasons set forth herein and/or offsets be permitted for the claims as set forth in the Adversary  
11 Proceeding. Front Sight requests such other relief as this Court deems just and proper.

12 DATED this 6 day of February, 2023.

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