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8 9	Attorneys for the U.S. Trustee for Region 17 TRACY HOPE DAVIS	
10	UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT	
11	DISTRICT OF NEVADA	
12	In re	Case No: BK-S-22-11824-ABL
13	FRONT SIGHT MANAGEMENT LLC,	Chapter 11
14	Debtor.	Date: September 30, 2022 Time: 9:30 a.m.
15	Debioi.	Location: Foley Courtroom 1, Telephonic
16	OBJECTION AND RESERVATION OF RIGHTS OF THE U.S. TRUSTEE TO THE DEBTOR'S APPLICATION TO EMPLOY GREENBERG TRAURIG, LLP AS SPECIAL COUNSEL PURSUANT TO 11 U.S.C. §§ 327(e), 328 AND 330 <u>EFFECTIVE AS OF AUGUST 5, 2022</u>	
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19	To the Honorable AUGUST B. LANDIS, Chief United States Bankruptcy Judge:	
20	Tracy Hope Davis, United States Trustee for Region 17 (the "U.S. Trustee"), by and	
21	through her undersigned counsel, hereby objects (the "Objection") to the Debtor's Application to	
22	Employ Greenberg Traurig, LLP as Special Counsel Pursuant to 11 U.S.C. §§ 327(e), 328 and	
23	330 Effective as of August 5, 2022 [ECF No. 329] (the "Application") filed by captioned debtor	
24	Front Sight Management LLC ("Debtor").1	
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26	title 11 of the United States Code, 11 U.S.C. §§ 101-1532 as amended, unless otherwise indicated. All references to "FRBP" are to the Federal Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure and to "FRE" are to the Federal Rules of Evidence.	
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I. <u>INTRODUCTION</u>

The retention of Greenberg Traurig LLP ("GT") should be denied because GT does not meet the definition of counsel who can be employed as special counsel under Section 327(e) and should therefore seek employment under the more stringent standard set forth in Section 327(a). The Application lacks evidence, as opposed to conclusory statements, required to satisfy the burden concerning Section 328. For these reasons, the Court should sustain the U.S. Trustee's objection and deny the Application.

In support the U.S. Trustee states the following:

II. MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES

FACTS

- 1. On May 24, 2022, the Debtor filed a voluntary petition under Chapter 11 commencing this case. [See ECF No. 1].
 - 2. The Section 341 meeting of creditors is set for June 23, 2022. [See ECF No. 3].
- 3. On June 9, 2022, the U.S. Trustee filed a Notice of Appointment of an Official Committee of Unsecured Creditors ("OCUC"]. [See ECF No. 116].
- 4. Neither the Debtor's counsel or financial advisor ("FA"), nor the OCUC's counsel or FA had the terms of their employment or compensation approved under Section 328. [See ECF Nos. 224 (BG Law LLP as Debtor's counsel), 225 (Province, LLC as Debtor's FA), 299

The United States Trustee requests that the Court take judicial notice of the pleadings and documents filed in this case pursuant to FRBP 9017 and FRE 201. To the extent that this Objection contains factual assertions predicated upon statements made or documents filed by the Debtor, Greenberg Traurig LLP, or their agents or representatives, the U.S. Trustee submits that such factual assertions are supported by admissible evidence in the form of admissions of a party opponent under FRBP 9017 and FRE 801(d) (2).

(Carlyon Cica, Chtd. as OCUC's local counsel), 302 (Kelley Drye & Warren LLP as OCUC's lead counsel) & 303 (Dundon Advisers LLP as OCUC's FA)].²

- 5. The Application was filed on August 29, 2022 and seeks to employ GT as special counsel pursuant to Sections 327(e), 328, 330, 1107 and 1108 to provide legal advice and assistance related to developing a membership plan and drafting membership agreement templates, and related documentation. [See ECF No. 329, pp. 2 (¶3) & 4 (¶12) of 19].
- 6. The Application is supported by the declaration of Jim Mace ("Mace Declaration"). [See ECF No. 330]. Attached to the Mace Declaration is an Engagement Agreement dated August 5, 2022. [See ECF No. 330, pp. 13-21 of 21].
- 7. The Application asserts that GT has no adverse interest with respect to the matter on which it is to be employed and therefore can be employed as special counsel under Section 327(e). [See ECF No. 329, pp. 6-7 of 19; ¶¶27-32].
- 8. Through the Application, GT seeks approval of its hourly rates, which range from \$250 to \$835,³ and to be employed pursuant to the terms of the Engagement Agreement. [See ECF No. 329, p. 5 of 19; ¶¶20-21].
- 9. The Application and the Engagement Agreement provide for the possibility of modifying GT's scope of engagement or for additional representations by GT of the Debtor or its affiliates. [See ECF No. 329, p. 5 of 19; ¶19; ECF No. 330, p. 14 of 21]. For the purposes of determining adversity, the Engagement Agreement limits its focus only to the Debtor and not to any of its affiliates, insiders or other persons connected to the Debtor. [See ECF No. 330, p. 14 of 21; ¶2b]. The Engagement Agreement provides for a waiver of conflicts and/or potential conflicts arising from GT's representation of other clients, except for representing clients adverse to the Debtor within the scope of GT's employment. [See ECF No. 330, p. 15 of 21; §3].

² Lucas Horsfall was granted Section 328 relief as Debtor's accountant. [See ECF No. 326].

³ The Application and Mace Declaration provide that GT shareholders generally bill between \$510 and \$775 per hour, but it should be noted that Mr. Mace seeks approval to bill at \$850 per hour. [See ECF 329 p. 5 of 19; ¶¶20-21; ECF No. 330,p. 3 of 21; ¶¶9-10]. The Engagement Agreement provides that GT senior attorneys bill at hourly rates up to \$1,800. [See ECF No. 330, 16 of 21; ¶5b].

10. The Engagement Agreement also requires disagreements between GT and the Debtor to be resolved through arbitration. [See ECF No. 330, p. 19 of 21; ¶10g].

ARGUMENT

- A. The Application should be denied because GT does not meet the requirements for employment under Section 327(e).
- 11. The Bankruptcy Code provides that:

The trustee, with the court's approval, may employ, for a specified special purpose, other than to represent the trustee in conducting the case, an attorney that has represented the debtor, if in the best interest of the estate, and if such attorney does not represent or hold any interest adverse to the debtor or to the estate with respect to the matter on which such attorney is to be employed.

11 U.S.C. § 327(e) (emphasis added).

12. There is no evidence that GT previously represented the Debtor. [See ECF Nos. 329-330]. The Mace Declaration provides that the Debtor's name was run through a conflicts search and was not a former or present client of GT's. [See ECF No. 330, pp. 5 & 8 of 21]. See re Sonya D. Intern., Inc., 484 B.R. 773, 780 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. 2012) ("There is certainly substantial authority that Section 327(e) does not apply in the present circumstances. See 3 Collier ¶ 327.04[9][b] pp. 327–51 to 327–52 (the "majority" approach "imposes an express requirement of prior representation of the debtor")."). Therefore, GT should seek employment under Section 327(a) as special counsel. See id. (citing In re Fondiller, 15 B.R. 890, 892 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 1981)).4

⁴ See also In re Kearney, 609 B.R. 383, 385-386 (Bankr. D.N.M. 2019) citing In re Champ Car World Series, LLC, 411 B.R. 619, 624 (Bankr. S.D. Ind. 2008) (clear language of the section requires prior representation of the debtor); In re J.S. II, LLC, 371 B.R. 311, 319 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 2007) (most courts hold that special counsel must have represented the debtor at some point prior to the commencement of the case); Meespierson, Inc. v. Strategic Telecom, Inc., 202 B.R. 845, 848-50 (D. Del. 1996) (special counsel application could not be approved because there was no prior representation); In re Black & White Cab Co. Inc., 175 B.R. 24, 26 (Bankr. E.D. Ark.

- 13. GT does not meet the requirements of Section 327(e).
- 14. Accordingly, the Application to employ GT as Section 327(e) special counsel should be denied or amended to seek GT's employment under Section 327(a).
 - B. The Proponent of the Application Fails to Carry the Burden of Establishing the Reasonableness of the Terms and Conditions for Retention and Compensation included in the Application, Supporting Declaration and Engagement Agreement.
- 15. While Section 327 addresses employment of professionals, 11 U.S.C. §§ 328 and 330 address compensation of those professionals after they have been employed under Section 327. Section 330 authorizes the bankruptcy court to award the retained professional reasonable compensation "based on an after-the-fact consideration of 'the nature, the extent, and the value of such services, taking into account all relevant factors." *In re Smart World Technologies, LLC*, 552 F.3d 228, 232 (2d Cir. 2009) (quoting Section 330(a)).
- 16. Section 328 operates differently and "permits a professional to have the terms and conditions of its employment pre-approved by the bankruptcy court, such that the bankruptcy court may alter the agreed-upon compensation only 'if such terms and conditions prove to have been improvident in light of developments not capable of being anticipated at the time of the fixing of such terms and conditions." *In re Circle K Corp.*, 279 F.3d 669, 671 (9th Cir. 2002); *In re Smart World Technologies, LLC*, 552 F.3d at 232 (noting that "section 328(a) permits a bankruptcy court to forgo a full post-hoc reasonableness inquiry if it pre-approves the "employment of a professional person under section 327 ... on any reasonable terms and conditions of employment" (quoting Section 328(a)). Thus, pre-approval of compensation pursuant to Section 328 is not lightly permitted. *Owens v. United States Trustee (In re Owens)*, 2014 Bankr. LEXIS 3346, at *7 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. August 6, 2014).
 - 17. Section 328 only provides the possible basis for approval of terms of

^{1994) (}attorney must have previously represented debtor); *In re French*, 139 B.R. 485, 489 (Bankr. D.S.D. 1992) (counsel with no prior connection to debtor could not be retained under § 327(e)); *In re Ginco Inc.*, 105 B.R. 620, 621 (D. Colo. 1988) (§ 327(a) applies, rather than § 327(e), where attorney did not represent the debtor pre-petition).

compensation. See generally In re Circle K Corp., 279 F.3d 669, 671 (9th Cir. 2002).

- 18. "The differences between §§ 328 and 330 affect the timing and process of the court's review of fees." *In re Citation Corp.*, 493 F.3d 1313, 1318 (11th Cir. 2007). Under Section 328, "the bankruptcy court reviews the fee at the time of the agreement and departs from the agreed fee only if some unanticipated circumstance makes the terms of that agreement unfair. Under Section 330, the court reviews the fees after the work has been completed and looks specifically at what was earned, not necessarily at what was bargained for at the time of the agreement." *Id.*
- 19. The burden of proof to establish the terms and conditions of employment including the imposition of Section 328(a) is on the applicant. *Nischwitz v. Miskovic (In re Airspect Air, Inc.)*, 385 F.3d 915, 921 (6th Cir. 2004) (quoting *Zolfo, Cooper & Co. v. Sunbeam-Oster Co.*, 50 F.3d 253, 262 (3d Cir. 1995)). To meet its burden, the firm must provide specific evidence to establish that "the terms and conditions are in the best interest of the estate." *In re Gillett Holdings, Inc.*, 137 B.R. 452, 455 (Bankr. D. Colo. 1991); *In re Thermadyne Holdings Corp.*, 283 B.R. 749, 756 (B.A.P. 8th Cir. 2002); *In re Potter*, 377 B.R. 305, 307-08 (Bankr. D. N.M. 2007) ("The trustee seeking to employ a professional under 11 U.S.C. § 328 bears the burden of showing that the provisions of the proposed employment are reasonable.").
- 20. Here, Debtor seeks to have GT's hourly rates and terms of employment approved through the Application and Engagement Agreement. [See ECF Nos. 329 & 330].
- 21. Although the Application and the Mace Declaration make general statements about the reasonableness of the terms, they fail to establish the reasonableness of these terms given the specific facts of this case.
- 22. Pre-approval of a professional's terms of compensation as reasonable should not be granted lightly given that the Court may not revisit the issue at the compensation stage unless such terms prove to have been improvident in light of developments not capable of being anticipated at the time the terms or rates were fixed. *See* 11 U.S.C. § 328(a); *see also Friedman Enters. v. B.U.M. Int'l, Inc. (In re B.U.M. Int'l, Inc.)*, 229 F.3d 824, 829 (9th Cir. 2000) ("There

is no question that a bankruptcy court may not conduct a § 330 inquiry into the reasonableness of the fees and their benefit to the estate if the court already has approved the professional's employment under [] § 328.").

- 23. Approving an arrangement under Section 328 removes the standard of reasonable compensation based on an after-the-fact consideration of "the nature, the extent, and the value of such services, taking into account all of the relevant factors" under Section 330, and instead replaces it with a standard that severely constrains the Court's authority to only disallow compensation that is "improvident in light of developments not capable of being anticipated at that time." 11 U.S.C. §328(a). The Court should not allow GT to bypass a full post-hoc reasonableness inquiry if employment is approved under 11 U.S.C. §327.
- Debtor has not met its burden of proof to demonstrate why or how the terms, conditions, and structure of GT's compensation are reasonable under 11 U.S.C. §328(a) and should be approved at the outset of GT's employment by the Debtor instead of being subject to review once GT seeks compensation, including at the end of the case once the Court and parties-in-interest can better assess GT's performance. A professional's requested invocation of Section 328(a) is neither mandatory nor automatic, regardless of the proposed compensation scheme. A professional should not automatically expect approval of its retention under Section 328 just because it asks for it. Accordingly, the Court should deny the request to pre-approve the terms of GT's employment and compensation under Section 328 or under some other Code provision.
- 25. Under the Engagement Agreement, the Debtor waives conflicts or potential conflicts outside of the Debtor and the specified scope of GT's employment. [See ECF No. 330, p. 15 of 21; §3]. However, the disinterestedness provision of Section 327(a) is mandatory. It is stricter than the conflict of interest provisions in the Model Rules of Professional Conduct because § 327(a) does not allow for the waiver of conflicts of interest. See S.S. Retail Stores Corp., 211 B.R. 699, 703 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 1997); compare Nevada Rules of Professional Conduct, Rule 1.7(b)(4). Because GT should be employed under Section 327(a), if at all, GT must meet the higher requirements for Section 327(a), which includes disinterestedness under

Section 101(14) including the catchall provision within Section 101(14)(C).

- 26. The arbitration provision may also be unreasonable, at least to the extent it interferes with the Court's consideration of disputes under the Bankruptcy Code. *See In re Home Express, Inc.*, 226 B.R. 657, 658-59 (Bankr. N.D. Cal. 1998) (While arbitration enjoys a "favored status," disputes relating to 11 U.S.C. §§ 327 through 331 "fall within the extremely narrow category of disputes which Congress probably never envisioned being delegated to nonjudicial entities for resolution.").
- 27. The Court should decline to approve any Section 328 provisions requested in the Application and Engagement Agreement and subject GT's fee application to a review unconstrained by pre-approval of any compensation terms at the beginning of this case.

WHEREFORE, the United States Trustee requests that the Court enter an order denying the Application and granting such other and additional relief as is just and equitable.

Dated: September 16, 2022

Respectfully submitted,

TRACY HOPE DAVIS
UNITED STATES TRUSTEE, REGION 17
By: /s/ Edward M. McDonald Jr.
Edward M. McDonald Jr., Esq.,
Trial Attorney